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NUMBER 1

The conclusion here reached is that the Wyoming statute prohibit.
ing selling below cost not only does not accomplish its avowed purposes, but the blanket prohibition of below cost sales actually contributes to the alleged evils sought to be remedied by the legislation. In
support of this conclusion, Professor Henderson contends that experience with such laws demonstrates that they are not susceptible to uni.
form and fair application or to meaningful judicial interpretation. The
discussion examines the practical effect of this form of regulation in
light of broader policy goals. The suggestion is made that these statutes
are unnecessary and undesirable.

SELLING BELOW COST IN WYOMING
Stanley D. Henderson*

T

HE general business collapse of the thirties prompted an
abundance of legislation 'designed to mitigate the hazards
of aggressive price competition during a period of falling
prices and declining consumer demand.1 Perhaps none of the
various enactments raises as many serious doubts about objectives, and the means selected for realization, as do the
statutes prohibiting selling below cost, still with us today in
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming. Member, Colorado
Bar Association. B.A., Coe College; LL.B. University of Colorado.
1. The codes of fair competition contained in the N R A legislation fixed
minimum prices, prohibited sales below cost, and generally condemned price
reductions; on the state level statutes directly fixing prices, establishing
resale price maintenance and prohibiting price discrimination were enacted.
McAllister, Price Control By Law in the United States: A Survey, 4 LAW
CONTEMP. PROS. 273, 286-300 (1937). Following the collapse of the N R A
in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the Robinson-Patman Act was adopted, Section 2(a) of which prohibits price discrimination which tends to "lessen, injure, destroy or prevent competition,"
and Section 3 of which declares it unlawful "to sell goods at unreasonably
low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor." 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964); 49 Stat. 1528 (1936),
*

15 U.S.C. § 13a (1964).
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Wyoming2 and a majority of states." Although such statutes,
popularly known as "unfair sales acts" or "unfair practices
acts," take a variety of forms, in general they forbid sales
below "cost" made with the purpose, intent or effect of injuring a competitor and destroying competition.' These laws
not only create difficult problems of application for the lawyer
who must advise businessmen concerning pricing policies, but
they pose the more significant question of whether in practical effect price competition is impaired at the expense of the
consuming public.
Analysis of selling below cost is hampered by the infrequency of cases which explore relevant legal and economic
issues in the context of the legislation. Still less is known
about the extent to which blanket prohibitions of below cost
sales affect day-to-day business conduct. The fact that the
statutes have not generated substantial activity to 'date, however, does not mean they can safely be ignored. Indeed the
2. Wyo. STAT. §§ 40-24 to -33 (1957). As was true in other states, the Wyoming sales below cost act was combined with legislation proscribing area
price discrimination. Wyo. STAT. § 40-23 (1957).
8. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1461 to 1466 :(1956); ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 70301 to -314 (1957); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-101; COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 55-2-1 to 55-2-17 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 42-111 to -11Sa
(Supp. 1963); HAwAII REV. LAWS §§ 205-1 to -13 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§ 48-401 to -13 (1947), as amended, IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-401 to -13
(Supp. 1965) ; KY. REv. STAT. ANN. 365.030-.070, .900 (1962); LA. REV.
STAT. §§ 51:421-:427 (1950); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1201-1207
(1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, §§ 14E-14K (1954); MINN. STAT. §§
325.01-.07, .48, .49, .52 (1961); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 51-101 to
-118 (1947); NEs. REV. STAT. §§ 59-1201 to -1206 (1960); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 358:1-'5 (1955); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-10-01 to -08 (1960); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 598.1 to -.11 (1961); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 646.100-.180,
.990 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 211 to -17 (Purdon 1960); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. §§ 6-13-1 to -8 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 66-65 (1962); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 69-301 to -306 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-5-7 to 18
(1953); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59-9 to -19 (1950); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 19.90.010 to -.160, .900, .920 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 4678 (8A) to
-(8N) (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 100.30 (1963).
A compilation at 2 TRADE REQ. REP. %6571 outlines the scope of the acts.
They generally apply to most industries and products within the state.
Similar statutes prohibiting below cost sales of particular kinds of merchandise, principally tobacco and dairy products, have been enacted in at
least thirty states, including many of the states with acts of general application. A chart summarizing these "special industry laws" may be found
in 2 TRADE REG. REP. 1 6575-6581. An act pertaining to a specific subject
removes that subject from the provisions of an act of general application,
at least where the specific act is subsequently enacted. Henderson v. Hogue,
TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.)
68462, at 71933 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.
23, 1956).
4. The statutes are given survey treatment in 1 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPEMTION AND TRADE-MARKS 515-64 (2d ed. 1950), and LaRue, PitfaUs for
Price Competitors: State and Federal Restrictions on Below Cost or UnreasonablyLow Prices, 15 W. RES. L. REv. 35 (1963).
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implications of a failure of action may be as far-reaching as
action itself. This is particularly true with respect to Wyoming, where relative inactivity, coupled with the statute's
built-in potential for unsound application, may ultimately
produce uneven and harsh decisions in the event of stricter
enforcement. In addition to matters of substance, restrictions
on selling below cost are worthy of examination because of
the judicial techniques they have fostered. Attitudes about
competition most assuredly affect the type of society in which
we live. They also influence the manner in which legal concepts seek to preserve and maintain that society. The matter
of judicial response to the statutes will therefore be considered in connection with the more crucial problems created by the
legislation. The Wyoming statute will be viewed in the general
setting of legislative prohibitions on below cost selling.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Injurious sales below cost were not actionable at common
law unless made with a malicious purpose to harm a particullar competitor.' Early attempts to legislate protection from
sales below cost attracted little attention.' The anti-discrimination movement during the first decade of this century undoubtedly increased interest in price regulation as a legitimate form of economic control.! The price control device of
"fair trade,"' already well established in most states beginning with California in 1931, was further accelerated in 1936
5. The cases start with The Schoolmaster Case, Y.B. 11 Hen. IV 47, Pl. 21
(1410), holding that trespass would not lie against a new competitor
(teacher) whose rates were substantially less than plaintiffs. The "malicious purpose" doctrine is usually attributed to Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn.
145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909).
6. South Carolina, as a part of its antitrust legislation, in 1902 declared sales
at less than cost with the purpose of "driving out competition" or "financially injuring competitors" to be unfair competition and conspiracies to
form a monopoly. S.C. Laws 1902, ch. 26, § 19. Other states similarly
broadened their antitrust statutes. Ark. Acts 1905, ch. 1; Tenn. Laws 1907,
ch. 36; Idaho Laws 1911, ch. 215, § 4. The unenthusiastic response to this
approach is explained partly because the statutes failed to define "cost"
and partly because they were viewed as merely extensions of general antitrust policy. Rodgers, Unfair Sales Laws: Advantages and Objections, 38
A.B.A.J. 921, 922 (1952).
7. Wyoming in 1911 enacted legislation prohibiting price discrimination. Wyo.
Laws 1911, ch. 62, at 84-85, as amended, Wyo. Laws 1923, ch. 86, at 154,
now found in Wyo. STAT. § 40-18 (1957).
8. Fair trade statutes enable a supplier of branded or trademarked products,
in free and open competition with goods of the same general class, to fix
by contract a minimum or stipulated resale price.
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by the stamp of federal approval.' The general unsuitability
of fair trade laws to the grocery and drug industries,1" however, together with the growing practice of "loss leader""
selling, encouraged trade groups to push for minimum floor
price laws applicable to all products. With the demise of the
NRA codes in 1935, perhaps the greatest impetus was given
to the modern development of statutes prohibiting sales below cost.12
The political explanation of the Wyoming act appears
to be not unlike that of other states. Trade associations in
the grocery field secured the adoption of a model act in California in 1933.1' These same groups deluged state legislatures
with similar proposals during the late thirties.1" That the
lobbying techniques employed were effective is evidenced by
the fact that by 1939 twenty-four states had enacted such
legislation, 5 including Wyoming, which in 1937 incorporated
the California model.'" An examination of the history of sales
below cost statutes clearly reveals a lack of consumer representation in the formulation and adoption of the legislation.
Nor 'does the swiftness of adoption in most states suggest that
the laws are a product of critical, objective legislative investi9. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936),
upheld the constitutionality of the Illinois fair trade law as a proper exercise of state police powers. A year later Congress sheltered fair trade
agreements from the federal antitrust laws. Miller-Tydings Act, 50 Stat.
693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
10. Fair trade laws, applying only to branded merchandise, do not limit price
competition of bulk or unbranded products. See F T C, REPORT ON RESALE
PRICE MAINTENANCE 274-333 (1945).
11. The term generally refers to the practice of selling certain items below
cost or the normal markup for the purpose of attracting customers to the
seller's place of business.
12. It has been suggested that enactment of sales below cost statutes is largely
the work of pressure groups seeking a permanent substitute for the price
controls of the N R A Note, 52 HARv. L. REv. 1142, 1148-49 (1939).
13. Cal. Stats. (1933) ch. 504, at 1280. Prior to the adoption of the act the
California courts apparently considered selling below cost not an unfair
business practice, even if done with intent to eliminate a competitor. Katz
v. Kapper, 7 Cal. App.2d 1, 44 P.2d 1060 (1935).
14. The Food and Grocery Conference, representing a number of trade associations, was apparently the moving force. Comment, 32 ILL. L. REv. 816, 846
(1938). Cf. Cupp, The Unfair PracticesAct, 10 So. CAL. L. REV. 18 (1936).
15. 2 MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, STATE PRICE CONTROL LEGISLATION, U. S. WORKS
PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION XLVIII-LI (1940), sets out the history of the
unfair sales acts.
16. The Wyoming legislature was apparently so enamored with the California
model that it saw fit to borrow even a typographical error. ("this act shall
be literally [liberally] construed that the beneficial purposes may be subserved.") WYO. STAT. § 40-93 (1957). The obvious error was recognized in
Civic Ass'n. v. Railway Motor Fuels, 57 Wyo. 213, 116 P.2d 236 (1941).
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gation. These considerations became particularly meaningful
when the courts, presented with objections to the statutes,
engaged in certain presumptions about legislative conduct
concerning the need and effect of such legislation.
COVERAGE AND APPLICATION

Unlike the majority of states with statutes of general
application, the Wyoming act applies to sales by manufacturers and producers as well as retailers and wholesalers. 7 The
reasons for extension of the act to non-distributive businesses
are not entirely clear, particularly since one of the immediate
evils to be remedied by the legislation was loss leader selling
at the retail level." One explanation may be that proponents
of the legislation reasoned that desirable resale price levels
could best be maintained if the retailer was precluded from
buying below the producer's cost. Or it may have been thought
that this approach insured coverage of the vertically integrated producer selling as a wholesaler or retailer."
Offering or advertising to sell, as well as a sale, of "any
article or product" at "less than the cost thereof" to the
seller is unlawful under the Wyoming act, provided the offer
or sale is "for the purpose of injuring competitors or destroying competition."" That the language "any article or
product" is susceptible of broad interpretation is illustrated
by a ruling that a restaurant meal sold at less than cost
17. WYO. STAT. § 40-24 (1957): "It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, firm, corporation, joint stock company, or other association engaged
in business within this state . . ." Inclusion of the terms "persons" and
"association" was undoubtedly designed to permit trade associations to
police the act. Nearly two-thirds of the statutes are limited to retailers
and wholesalers. See 2 TRADE REG. REP. 6641.
18. "One of the chief aims of state laws prohibiting sales below cost was
to put an end to 'loss-leader' selling." Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma
Retail Grocers Ass'n., 322 P.2d 179 (Okla. 1957), aff'd 360 U.S. 334, 340
(1959). One writer suggests sales below cost acts may be effective only
as devices for limiting loss leader practices. Grether, Experience In California with Fair Trade Legislation Restricting Price Cutting, 24 CALIF. L.
REV. 640, 691 (1936).
19. Some statutes specifically cover this situation by definition. E.g., Wis. STAT.
§ 100.30(2) (g) (1963) : "The term 'retailer' shall apply to manufacturers
who sell to retailers and who own or operate retail stores or sell direct to
to the public .... .
20. WYO. STAT. § 40-24 (1957). Although the applicability of the intent requirement ("for the purpose of injuring competitors and destroying competition")

to sales rather than offers of sale is not obvious from the phrasing of the
section, it has been held applicable. State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 346, 84
P.2d 767, 772 (1938).
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probably violates the act." Most of the statutes which include
producers within their coverage also prohibit sales of "service or output of a service trade" below cost. 2 The Wyoming
act fails to include a general prohibition with respect to services. Rather, only specified services performed upon another's personal property are expressly subject to below cost
restrictions.2" It is possible this limited coverage of service
trades was the result of mere inadvertence. 2 Although a significant number of statutes apply only to specified commodities, 5 the attempt to expressly exclude certain businesses
from the statutes of general application has not always met
with judicial approval.2 The exclusion problem has not arisen
in Wyoming since the statute applies, subject to stated exemptions to be noted, to all sales within the state.
Gifts, or offers or advertisements of gifts, made with the
requisite anti-competitive intent are similarly prohibited by
the Wyoming statute. 7 As a practical matter this means that
any gift is unlawful assuming it can be shown that the donor21. [1932-1940] Wyo. ATTy GEN. REP. & OFF'L OP'NS 535 (May 28, 1937).
22. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-301 (1957); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-3
(1963).
23. WYO. STAT. § 40-27 (1957); "Any person, firm or corporation who performs
work upon, renovates, alters or improves any personal property belonging
to another person, firm or corporation, shall be construed to be a vendor
within the meaning of this act."
24. Most states adopting the California model incorporated the prohibition of
sales of "service or output of a service trade." These states also included
the Wyoming-type provision covering services to personality, but in a later
section of the act, the exemption section, apparently as a means of broadening
the definition of "service or output of a service trade" to assure coverage
of laundries, dry cleaning businesses, repair shops, etc. See, e.g., MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. §§ 51-103, -107 (1961). Hence the Wyoming legislature may
have intended to omit coverage of service trades entirely, but inadvertently
neglected to delete the reference to services in the exemption section. This
explanation seems plausible in light of the fact that only one other statute
of general application, that of Utah, presently takes the services-to-personalty approach, and the legislative history of the Utah act appears distinguishable. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-5-7, 13-5-12 (1953).
25. See note 3 supra, concerning the "special industry" or "special commodity"
statutes, primarily covering tobacco and dairy products.
26. The "arbitrary" exclusion of grain and feed dealers from the operation of
the Kansas act amounted to an unconstitutional classification. State v.
Consumers Warehouse Mkt., Inc., 185 Kan. 363, 343 P.2d 234 (1959).
Motion picture films, when licensed for exhibition to motion picture houses,
are expressly exempt from below cost prohibitions in several states. E.g.,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.90.020 (1961). Such exemptions have been
held not to create an arbitrary or unreasonable classification in violation
of the state constitution. State v. Sears, 4 Wash.2d 200, 103 P.2d 337 (1940).
27. WYO. STAT. § 40-24 (1957)-: "or give, offer to give or advertise the intent
to give away any article or product for the purpose of injuring competitors
and destroying competition." A gift to a competitor's customers of two
weeks free laundry service violates this section. Laundry Operating Co. v.
Spalding Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 383 S.W.2d 364 (Ky. 1964).
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merchant intended to injure competitors and destroy competition."8 The area of difficult application of the gift prohibition is where, as a promotional scheme, a merchant advertises or sells one or more items with another item at a combined price, or one item is offered as a "gift" with the sale
of another. The Wyoming act does not explicitly cover this
type of activity.29 The trend of decisions generally indicates
that in order to avoid violation of the statute, the selling price
of the combination of items must at least equal the combined
minimum statutory cost of each."0 The case of Eckdahl v. Hurwitz"1 suggests that Wyoming will follow this aggregate cost
approach. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin a competitor engaged
in the operation of a" suit club" (a promotional scheme whereby a member pays nominal weekly or monthly dues which
buy a chance in a suit drawing) on the ground that defendant
was selling below cost. The Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's finding that "the whole or entire transaction
must be considered, and the evidence shows that... defendant
made money on the entire transaction .... I,"'
There is disagreement as to whether or not the giving
of trading stamps with the purchase of a product will reduce
the sale to one below cost. If the net selling price is below
cost after deduction of a sum equal to the value of the stamps,
the statute would clearly appear to be violated.33 Neverthe28. Proof an unlawful purpose appears not to be without difficulty, at least
as to gifts of small value. For example, "welcome wagon" gifts have been
ruled not in violation of a statute similar to that of Wyoming, on the theory
that there exists no intent to injure competitors or destroy competition.
Opinion of Attorney General of Washington, TRADE REG. REP. (1955 Trade
Cas.)
68065, at 70443 (May 26, 1955).
29. At least eighteen states handle combination sales and gifts by provisions
defining cost with respect to the price of each item sold or offered. E.g.,
CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-11 (1963).
30. State v. Tankar Gas, Inc., 250 Wis. 218, 26 N.W.2d 647 (1947), so holds,
where the gift is tied to, or contingent upon the purchase of a greater
quantity of the same goods. The effect of promotional activities on statutes
prohibiting below-cost sales is considered in an annotation in 70 A.L.R.2d
1080, 1084-85 (1960).
31. 56 Wyo. 19, 103 P.2d 161 (1940).
32. Id. at 23, 103 P.2d at 162. Three years prior to this decision the Wyoming
Attorney General's office took the position that operation of a suit club
violated the act if a contributor to the club obtained a suit for less than
the cost to the vendor. [1932-1940) Wyo. ATT'Y. GEN. REP. & OFF'L. OP'NS.
511-514 (April 12, 1937). This view has been accepted by other courts.
62781, at 64311
Robinson v. Hayes, TRADE REG. REP. (1950-51 Trade Cas.)
(Tenn. Ct. App. March 2, 1951).
33. See Clark, Statutory Restrictions on Selling Below Cost, 11 VAND. L. REV.
105, 124 (1957). At least one state has so concluded, by amending its act
to provide that trading stamps "shall be considered a reduction of the
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less, many courts regard trading stamps as the equivalent
of a discount for cash rather than a reduction in the price of
the article sold.3" The matter probably still has some vitality
in Wyoming in view of the stated exceptions in the recent
legislation prohibiting the use of trading stamps." Should

the question of whether the trading stamp must be taken into
account in determining whether the below cost statute has
been violated be presented to the Wyoming Supreme Court, it

appears the court will follow the view that trading stamps are
not devices which reduce the selling price of a product."
Not every sale transaction is subject to the prohibitions
of the Wyoming statute. Judicial sales, sales of damaged or
deteriorated goods, sales of seasonal or perishable goods to
prevent spoilage or depreciation, and sales to close out all

or any portion of an owner's stock for the purpose of discontinuing trade in such stock are exempt, provided prior notice
selling price . . . by the redeemable value of the trading stamp in cash
or merchandise, whichever is greater." UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-9 (1953).
The cost of participating in a trading stamp plan must be included in the
seller's "cost of doing business" for purposes of cost competition under the
sales below cost acts. Hogue v. Kroger Co., 210 Tenn. 1, 356 S.W.2d 267
(1962); Trade Comm'n. v. Bush, 123 Utah 302, 259 P.2d 304, 305 (1953);
Opinion of the Attorney General of Idaho, TRADE REG. REP. (1955 Trade
68100, at 70569 (March 31, 1955).
Cas.)
34. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n., 322 P.2d 179 (Okla.
1957), aff'd, 360 U.S. 334 (1959); Food & Grocery Bureau v. Garfield, 20
Cal.2d 228, 125 P.2d 3 (1942); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, 15
N.J. 203, 104 A.2d 310 (1954); Contra, Hogue v. Kroger Co., supra note
33; Cf., Note, 36 TExAs L. REV. 691 (1958) ; 44 MINN. L. REv. 1186 (1960).
The Wyoming act is silent on the deductibility of cash discounts. Most
statutes do not permit reduction of cost to the buyer by deducting the
cash discount. E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17026. This approach is, of
course, based on the erroneous assumption that the buyer for cash and the
buyer on credit have purchased identical commodities. See Clark, supra
note 33, at 120. Absent a statutory prohibition, the cash buyer has been
allowed to deduct the cash discount in computing his cost. People v. Lucky
62623, at 63814
Stores, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1950-1951 Trade Cas.)
(Super. Ct. Cal. May 5, 1950). To refuse to permit the deduction may produce an unconstitutional cost figure. Cohen v. Frey & Son, Inc., 197 Md.
586, 80 A.2d 267 (1951).
35. Wyo. STAT. § 6-224.2(a), (b) (Supp. 1965) wherein there is exempted from
the prohibitions of the legislation, stamps or coupons issued and redeemable
by manufacturers or a merchant "at face value, in cash or merchandise
from the general stock of said merchant at regular retail prices at the
option of the holder thereof."
36. In the opinion on rehearing in Steffy v. City of Casper, 357 P.2d 456 (Wyo.
1960), rehearing358 P.2d 951, 954 (Wyo. 1961), upholding the constitutional
validity of the Trading Stamp Act, the court, in discussing the reasonableness of the exception applicable to merchants, states: "In the case where
a merchant issues and redeems his own stamps, either in cash or merchandise
from his general stock, it amounts to nothing more than giving a discount
"
on purchases from him ....
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of the particular type of sale is given to the public." General
clearance sales of marked-down merchandise, however, are
not excluded from the operation of the Wyoming statute."
Nor are accommodation sales made by one retailer to another
retailer or by one wholesaler to another wholesaler excepted." '
As is true with respect to the statute in its entirety, the Wyoming group of exemptions fails to reflect distribution techniques introduced since the date of original enactment of the
legislation. That the statute has resisted amendment since
1937 seems incredible, particularly in view of the modern
revolutions in retailing.
THE ELEMENT OF INTENT

Because sales below cost statutes impose criminal" as
well as civil sanctions, an intent to injure and destroy competition is deemed to be the touchstone of the legislation.4 ' Thus
absolute prohibitions of all sales at less than cost, irrespective
of the seller's state of mind, have generally not withstood constitutional objections. 2 The fact that the courts are apparent37. WYo. STAT. § 40-27 (1957). The section also exempts sales made "in good
faith to meet the legal prices of a competitor," which will be examined
separately below.
38. Many states exempt merchandise sold in bona fide clearance sales. E.g.,
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358:3 (1955). The clearance sale exemption may
be restricted to seasonal goods. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 598.6 (1961).
39. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 59-19 (1950). Isolated sales not made in the
usual course of business are exempt in several states. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 6-13-5 (1956). The majority of statutes, not including Wyoming,
exempt sales to governmental agencies or institutions, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 59-1206 (1960). Wyoming is in the minority of states not exempting sales
for charitable purposes. See Wis. STAT. § 100.30(6) (e) (1963).
40. Selling at less than cost is a misdemeanor in Wyoming, punishable by a
fine of not less than $100.00 nor more than $1,000.00, or by imprisonment
in the county jail for a period not exceeding 6 months, or both. WYO. STAT.
§ 40-32 (1957).
41. See, e.g., Martin v. Aleinikoff, 63 Wash.2d 842, 389 P.2d 422 (1964). Several
states require an alternative showing of either intent or effect of injuring
competitors. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-404 (1947). A statute containing
solely an effect requirement has been held in violation of due process. State
ex. rel. English v. Ruback, 135 Neb. 335, 281 N.W. 607 (1938). Cf. Englebrecht v. Day, 201 Okla. 585, 208 P.2d 538 (1949). A statute requiring
either intent or effect has been construed to require intent in all cases.
Hill v. Kusy, 150 Neb. 653, 35 N.W.2d 594 (1949). A contrary result was
reached in McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 292 N.W. 414 (1940). The
influence of Fairmount Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1926) is
apparent with respect to the phrasing of the intent requirement.
42. State v. Packard-Bamburger & Co., 16 N.J. Misc. 479, 2 A.2d 599 (Dist.
Ct. 1938), af'd, 123 N.J.L. 180, 8 A.2d 291 (1939); Commonwealth v.
Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A.2d 67 (1940); Opinion of the Justices, 152 Me.
458, 132 A.2d 47 (1957); Contra, May's Drug Stores, Inc. v. State Tax
Comm'n., 242 Iowa 319, 45 N.W.2d 245 (1950).
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ly in agreement that intent is an essential element of a violation, however, does not mean that there is even minimum
agreement as to the kind of intent which will make a sale
unlawful.
The Wyoming act, it will be recalled, makes a sale below
cost unlawful when made with the purpose "of injuring comIf this provision is
petitors and destroying competition."
literally applied by the courts it will invalidate practically
every sale below cost. Assuming relative inelasticity of demand, a merchant who intends to increase his volume of business knows that he must do so at the expense of his competitors. If he is successful he will have taken business away
from his rivals, thereby injuring them.
There is evidence that a general competitive intent to
attract additional customers might possibly satisfy the statute
in a given case. An early Colorado decision affirmed an injunction against sales below cost by engaging in the presumption that an actor intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts." That this proposition has some appeal
today is indicated by a recent case which concludes as a matter of law that an intent to effect a gain in business is inseparable from a intent to bring about a competitor's corresponding loss of business. 5 The opinion vividly 'demonstrates
the elusive nature of the intent requirement. The court interprets the phrase "injuring competitors and destroying competition" to mean a reduction of competition at the expense
See note 20 supra. There is some variation in the wording of the proscribed
purpose. E.g., the Nebraska statute prohibits selling below cost "with the
intent, or effect, of inducing the purchaser of other merchandise, or of
unfairly diverting trade from a competitor, or otherwise injuring a competitor . . . where the result . . . is to tend to deceive any purchaser or
prospective purchaser, or substantially lessen competition, or unreasonably
to restrain trade, or to tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1203 (1960). The language "of inducing the purchaser
of other merchandise" is obviously directed toward the use of loss-leaders.
The Hawaii act simply prohibits a sale below cost "with the intent to
destroy competition." HAWAsI REV. LAws § 205-4 (1955).
44. Dikeou v. Food Distribs. Ass'n., 107 Colo. 38, 108 P.2d 529, 534 (1940). The
Colorado courts have since abandoned this view in favor of a requirement
of a "specific intent" to injure. Perkins v. King Soopers, Inc., 122 Colo. 263,
221 P.2d 343 (1950). The Dikeou presumption has in essence been enacted
into the statutes of many states. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358:2 (1955):
"Evidence of any advertisement, offer to sell or sale of any item of merchandise by any retailer or wholesaler at less than cost to him, as herein
defined, shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this chapter."
45. Laundry Operating Co. v. Spalding Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., supra
note 27.

43.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol1/iss1/7

10

Henderson: Selling Below Cost in Wyoming

1966

SELLING BELOW COST

of a competitor. The court then theorizes that it is permissable to intend to capture a competitor's business "if carried
out fairly," but concludes it is "unfair" to divert business
from a rival by selling goods for less than cost." The mere
fact of a sale below cost is apparently decisive. In short the
court in its attempt to apply the intent requirement eliminates
intent as an element of liability.
Many of the cases, nevertheless, purport to distinguish
normal competitive intent by stating that the statute requires
a "specific intent."" When such an intent exists is not apparent from the cases. For example, in one case an injunction
prohibiting a retail grocer from selling milk below cost "for
the purpose of injuring, harassing or destroying competition"
was reversed on the basis of affidavits of defendant's competitors to the effect that they were not adversely affected
by the sales.4" The statutory offense, of course, did not turn
on the effect of the proscribed act, but whether the sale was
accompanied with unlawful intent. Where a retailer advertised and sold two items at less than cost with the admitted
intent to entice customers to his store so that they would
purchase items other than the advertised loss leaders, it was
held that this conduct at most was an attempt to attract customers away from competing stores and was not "predominately
motivated by an intent to 'injure competitors or destroy competition.' "" Other loss leader cases have reached the same
result, even though the record contains defendant's admission
that competitors were injured by loss of customers." If a
'defendant insists that his only intent was to increase his
business, and he is successful in doing so, the court may in
essence take judicial notice of the fact that of necessity the
46. Id. at 366.
47. E.g., in State v. Wolkoff, 250 Minn. 504, 85 N.W.2d 401, 404 (1957), the
court talks about "some specific culpable purpose."
48. State ex rel North Carolina Milk Comm'n. v. Dagenhart, 261 N.C. 281,
134 S.E.2d 361 (1964). The court apparently was influenced by defendant's
argument that a retailer could not reasonably compete with a wholesaler
who makes home deliveries of milk at fifty-five cents per half gallon, and
therefore selling at forty-nine cents was "not against the public interest."
49. Mott's Super Mkts., Inc. v. Frassinelli, 148 Conn. 481, 172 A.2d 381, 384
(1961).
50. Northern Cal. Food Dealers, Inc., v. Farmers Mkt., Inc., TRADE REG. REP.
68402, at 71723 (Super. Ct. Cal. June 29, 1956); Hen(1956 Trade Cas.)
68462, at 71933
derson v. Hogue, TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.)
(Tenn. App. Aug. 23, 1956). Cf., Rust v. Griggs, 172 Tenn. 565, 113 S.W.2d
733 (1938).
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sales volume of competitors will be reduced. 5' Evidence of
actual injury may not be totally irrelevant to the issue of unlawful intent, but to equate these factors in connection with
the statute in question is to in effect abandon the search for
an essential element of the stated offense.
At least one case suggests that intent to injure competitors or competition is insufficient unless there is accompanying proof of intent to destroy competition for purposes of
acquiring a monopoly." If a merchant's market position is
declining, and he testifies that his pricing policies were defensive in the face of competitors' actions, this may persuade
a court that legitimate reasons for selling below cost exist
other than the purpose of injuring competitors or destroying
competition. 3 At the same time, testimony by loss leader
sellers that the purpose of sales below cost was to increase
sales from any available source, without intended injury to
competitors, has blindly been accepted by courts without inquiry as to how this is realistically accomplished." A defendant must apparently directly solicit his competitor's customers on an individual basis before a clear case of unlawful
intent is found to exist. 5
A number of states have sought to allieviate the plaintiff's
burden of proof of unlawful intent by a statutory provision
that proof of a sale below cost is either presumptive or prima
facie evidence of such intent." The Wyoming act does not
51. Trade Comm'n. v. Bush, supra note 33, 259 P.2d at 306.
52. Simonetti, Inc. v. State ex rel. Gallion, 272 Ala. 398, 132 So.2d 252, 255
(1961).
53.
54.

State v. Wolkoff, supra note 47, 85 N.W.2d at 408.
E.g., Ellis v. Dallas, 113 Cal. App.2d 234, 248 P.2d 63 (1952); Sandler v.
Gordon, 94 Cal. App.2d 254, 210 P.2d 314 (1949); Mott's Super Mkts., Inc.

v. Frassinelli, 148 Conn. 481, 172 A.2d 381 (1961). The extent of a court's
indulgence is indicated by this language from an opinion finding no unlawful intent: "There is no evidence that (defendants), in operating his
business, had the intent to injure his competitors. He testified that he had
no such intent; that his object was 'to make money.' " Acme Distrib. Co.
v. Thoni, 23 Tenn. App. 638, 136 S.W.2d 734, 738 (1939).
55. E.g., Los Angeles Laundry Owner Ass'n. v. Cascade Laundry, Inc., TRADE
REG. REP. (1950-1951 Trade Cas.) J 62667, at 63919 (Super Ct. Cal. July
14, 1950; Laundry Operating Co. v. Spalding Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co.,
supra note 27. Contra, State ex rel Thomason v. Adams Dairy, 379 S.W.2d
553 (Mo. 1964).
56.

See note 44 supra. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-13 (1963); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 69-305 (1955); ME. REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 10 § 1205 (1964).

Such presumptions are, of course, rebuttable. Perkins v. King Soopers, Inc.,
supra note 44. Some cases indicate that a mere denial of unlawful purpose
by defendant is sufficient to rebut the presumption. See Sandier v. Gordon,
supra note 54.
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contain any such device for facilitating proof of intent. Aside
from constitutional problems, 7 such presumptions further
contribute to the confusion surrounding requisite intent. 8 In
fact they may operate to read the element of intent out of
the statute, thereby permitting a violation to turn on the presumption arising from the sale below cost." Such a result
of course undermines the purpose of requiring unlawful intent in the first place.
On the other hand, a statutory provision making a sale
below cost prima facie evidence of a violation may be practically useless even in a fairly strong factual setting." In
State ex rel. Thomason v. Adams Dairy Co.,"' the defendant
was charged with giving away milk "with the intent and with
the effect of unfairly diverting trade from a competitor or
of otherwise injuring a competitor." The statute further
provided that proof of such a gift was prima facie evidence
of violation of the act. Defendant, a new competitor, admitted that as a promotional scheme to introduce its product, it
distributed free milk to persons known to have previously
purchased milk from other retail outlets in the area in the
hope that these consumers would thereafter buy defendant's
product. The court found that plaintiff failed to sustain the
burden of proof of defendant's intent to unfairly divert trade
from a competitor.2
The Wyoming cases fail to clarify requisite intent. The
court in Eckdahl v. Hurwitz6 8 apparently misread the statute
57. Because of criminal sanctions in the unfair sales acts several cases have
held such presumptions unconstitutional on the theory the burden is placed
on the defendant to prove himself innocent of wrongful intent. E.g., Wiley
v. Sampson-Ripley Co., 151 Me. 400, 120 A.2d 289 (1956) ; Motts Super Mkt.,
Inc., v. Frassinelli, supra note 54. Other courts have upheld such presumptions on the ground that a rational connection between the fact to be proved
and the fact presumed exists. McIntire v. Borofsky, 95 N. H. 174, 59 A.2d
471 (1948); State v. Ross, 259 Wis. 379, 48 N.W.2d 460 (1951). Contra, Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F.Supp. 70 (D.C. Minn. 1938). Cf., 1941
Wis. L. REv. 425.
58 See, e.g., State v. Wolkoff, 250 Minn. 504, 85 N.W.2d 401 (1957), where
the plaintiff made a prima facie case of unlawful intent but was unable
to sustain it in view of defendants' testimony of "good faith."
59. This was the effect in Diehl v. Magic Empire Grocers Ass'n., 399 P.2d 460
(Okla. 1964).
60. A court may simply refuse to give effect to the presumption. See State v.
Twentieth Century Mkt., 236 Wis. 215, 294 N.W. 873 (1940).
61. 379 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. 1964).
62. Id. at 556. Cf. State v. Knowlan's Super Mkt., Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1960
Trade Cas.) 1 69791, at 77126 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 14, 1960).
63. 56 Wyo. 19, 103 P.2d 161 (1940).
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as requiring actual injury to a competitor, rather than a below
cost sale made with the "purpose" of accomplishing that result. The court affirmed denial of an injunction on the ground
there was substantial evidence in the record to support the
trial court's finding of failure to prove defendant's conduct
"injured competitors or destroyed competition.''" In addition to emasculating the intent requirement, this construction
ignores the unambiguous section of the statute providing for
injunctive relief without a showing of damage. 5
If the intent requirement is interpreted as satisfied only
by proof of a malicious purpose to injure a competitor, then
the statutes prohibiting selling below cost would seem to add
little to prior law."8 The leading Wyoming case of State v.
Langley, 7 however, suggests that the selling below cost statute goes beyond the common law rule that solely malicious
motives are actionable, and now prohibits sales made with
mixed motives of gain and intent to injure."8 This analysis
seems reasonable, and is supported by the cases, but as a
working tool its usefulness has obvious limitations. Save for
the firm clearly motivated by a predatory desire to eliminate
competitors and thereby achieve a dominant market position,
the motives of a seller are simply not subject to precise identification. Since mixed motives appear to co-exist in practically
every reported case, and the cases which find an unlawful intent are indistinguishable from those which do not, even the
notion that a specific intent to injure is required is apparently
unsuited for meaningful application by the courts. Hence the
whole issue of intent is without meaning.
The conclusion that the intent requirement should be
removed from the statute is inescapable. Constitutional objec64. Id. at 20, 103 P.2d at 162.
65. See Wyo. STAT. § 40-31 (1957).
66. See note 5 supra. It has been suggested that unless a presumption of
wrongful intent is held to exist by reason of a sale below cost, the state
of the law has not moved beyond the "malicious purpose" doctrine. 47 YALE
L.I. 1201, 1206 (1938). An early decision indicates the intent requirement
may be regarded by the courts as nothing more than a test of predatory
price-cutting. Balzer v. Caler, 11 Cal.2d 663, 82 P.2d 19 (1938).
67. State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767 (1938).
68. Id. at 354, 84 P.2d at 775. The question of whether defendant sold below
cost with unlawful intent was not properly before the court in the Langley
case, however, since defendant entered a plea of guilty to a criminal charge
of violating the act, thus admitting the elements of the offense, and thereafter filed a motion in arrest of judgment on grounds of unconstitutionality
of the statute.
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tions to this means of improving the statute could be met by
eliminating the criminal sanctions at the same time. That
criminal penalties are not an effective means of enforcing
this law is demonstrated by the fact that criminal prosecutions
are seldom instituted." Aside from this consideration, the
cases simply fail to reveal that the intent requirement furthers the avowed purpose of the statute of protecting the small
merchant from price cutting by the large competitor." The
multi-product seller is likely to set his prices with a view to the
prices of his multi-product competitors. Hence the ability
of the intent requirement to protect the small, single-product
seller is questionable. Moreover, if the economic consequences
of price cutting are the reason for having such legislation at
all, then the mental state of the price cutter is irrelevant.7 1
Although the intent requirement may be supported as enabling
the courts to mitigate an otherwise harsh statute, it can hardly be justified as contributing to the rational development of
law respecting selling below cost.
THE RIDDLE OF COST

The most objectionable provisions of the statute relate
to the determination of cost. The Wyoming act defines "production cost" to inchde "the cost of raw materials, labor and
all overhead expense of the producer;" the" distribution cost"
of a product means the lower of invoice or replacement cost
"to the distributor and vendor plus the cost of doing business by said distributor and vendor." 7 2 The "cost of doing
business," or overhead expense, is further defined to include:
[A]ll costs of doing business incurred in the conduct
of such business and must include within [sic 3]
limitation the following items of expense: labor,
including salaries of executives and officers, rent,
69.
70.

71.
72.
73.

In the opinion of the Wyoming Attorney General's office criminal prosecutions under the statute are less satisfactory than civil remedies. (1932-1940]
Wyo. ATT'Y GEN. REP. & OFF'L. OP'Ns. 511, 513-514 (Apr. 12, 1937).
Beyond the fact that the reported cases practically never involve powerful
defendants, it would seem almost impossible to prove unlawful intent on
the part of a large competitor who engages in the common practice of
discount retailing. See State v. Langley, supra note 67, at 351-353, 84 P.2d
at 774, for a discussion of the purpose of the statute.
See Clark, supra note 33, at 114.
Wyo. STAT. § 40-24 (1957).
This is apparently a typographical error, since the statute as originally
enacted stated "without limitation." See Wyo. Laws 1937, ch. 73 § 2, at 113.
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legal rate of interest on capital, depreciation, selling
cost, maintenance of equipment, delivery costs, credit
losses, all types of licenses, taxes, insurance and advertising."4
At the outset it should be noted that the cost provisions
of the statute have not been altered in the nearly thirty years
the statute has been in force. Since the nature of competition
has obviously undergone change during this period of time,
it would seem to follow that considerable changes in the nature
of costs have occurred which require complete re-examination
of cost factors in relation to the operation of statutory restrictions on selling below cost. Assuming the nature of market
rivalry greatly influences the composition of costs, competitive objectives cannot reasonably be pursued in reliance upon
outmoded beliefs about costs."5
In computing overhead, or the "cost of doing business,"
it is apparently the intent of the statute to prescribe inclusion
of the full and complete scale of costs incurred in the operation
of the seller's business."6 The obvious thing the statute neglects
to indicate is how these assorted components of cost are to
be allocated to the product which is the subject matter of sale
in question. In a'ddition, the statute employs "invoice or replacement cost" as the base figure from which a legal price
is to be calculated, but fails to give any indication as to how
invoice cost is to be identified."
Most of the state statutes applicable only to the distri74. WYo. STAT. § 40-24 (1957). If an article is purchased at a forced, bankrupt, close-out or other sale outside ordinary channels of trade, the invoice
cost cannot be used as a basis for justifying a price lower than one based
upon replacement cost (through ordinary channels of trade), unless the
article is advertised and sold as merchandise purchased at such a sale and
the quantity to be offered for sale is stated. WYO. STAT. § 40-25 (1957).
75. The need for a study of the structure and behavior of cost is discussed in
MASSEL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY 26-28 (1962).
76. The computation of cost must be made in good faith, and include only bona
fide costs. McIntire v. Borofsky, supra note 57. The difficulties in computing a manufacturer's overhead cost are noted in Dooley's Hardware Mart
70227, at 75864 (Super.
v. Does 1-10, TRADE REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.)
Ct. Cal. Jan. 31, 1962).
77. To avoid the problem of identifying the invoice price of particular goods,
some states, e.g., Idaho, define "replacement cost" as the "cost per unit at
which the merchandise sold . . . could have been bought at the nearest source
of supply by the . . . seller at any time within thirty (30) days prior to
to the date of sale ... if bought in the same quantity ... as the . . . seller's
last purchase of said merchandise." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-403 (Supp. 1965).
A manufacturer's current list price may be used as the basis for establishing prima facie evidence of cost in some states. MINN. STAT. § 325.01(5) (2)
(1961).
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butive trades attempt to avoid definitional problems by use
of a mark-up formula. A cost base of the lower of invoice or
replacement cost, less trade discounts except discounts for
cash, plus freight or cartage is established. The statute then
requires a fixed percentage 8 of the cost base figure to be
added as representative of the cost of doing business in the
absence of proof of a lower cost.7" Should a seller be unable
to prove his actual cost of doing business, these statutes supply the figure. The end result is a legal minimum price determined on the basis of an arbitrary mark-up.
The Wyoming statute, although not of the mark-up variety, accomplishes nearly the same result by declaring an
"established cost survey" to be competent evidence of a defendant's cost of doing business."0 As will be demonstrated
shortly, once the cost survey is admitted into evidence for all
practical purposes the issue of defendant's cost of doing business is foreclosed.
There is perhaps no better evidence of the inherent defect in the sales below cost statutes than the fact that devices
to facilitate proof of cost, in some form or other, appear in
most of the acts. The inclusion of such devices is simply an
admission that proof of actual cost is impossible. The validity
of this observation is readily apparent upon a moment's reflection. In the first place, the cost provisions of the Wyo78. One of several fallacies in the formula is that of expressing the cost of
doing business as a percentage of gross sales, when in fact the statute
applies the percentage markup to an invoice base. Because overhead may
be a specified percentage of gross sales does not mean it is the same percentage of invoice costs.
79. E.g., Wis. STAT. § 100:30(2) (A) (1963); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 598.2
(1961). The statutory mark-up for wholesalers is uniformly 2% of invoice
cost. With respect to retailers, the mark-up varies from 4% in Pennsylvania
to 12% in Arizona, although the great majority of such statutes adopt a
6% mark-up figure. Tennessee allows a mark-up amounting to not less
than the "minimum cost of distribution by the most efficient retailer,"
which mark-up, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is deemed to be
6%. TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-302 (a) (2) (1955).
80. WYO. STAT. § 40-26 (1957): "Where a particular trade or industry, of
which the person, firm or corporation complained against is a member, has
an established cost survey for the locality and vicinity in which the offense
is committed, the said cost survey shall be deemed competent evidence to be
used in proving the costs of the person, firm or corporation complained
against within the provisions of this act."

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1966

17

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 1 [1966], Iss. 1, Art. 7

252

LAND AND WATER LAW REvIEw

Vol. I

ming statute fail to precisely define relevant costs."' Assuming more meaningful draftsmanship is possible, the fact remains that businessmen do not keep records from which the
cost of each article sold may be accurately determindd. s2 To
attempt to do so would not only be prohibitive from a point
of view of accounting expense,88 but, to paraphrase one writer, a retailer who keeps records in sufficient detail to ascertain the cost of each item handled does not have to worry about
the statute because he is too busy doing his accounting to make
any sales. 4
More importantly, even assuming general agreement
among accountants as to a method of assigning overhead to
particular products," there is no rational way in which a
great number of business costs can be segregated and then
related to a particular item sold." Such business expenses as
light, heat and salaries, commonly known as "joint costs," are
difficult to apportion because:
[I]t would be impossible to say how much of a store
manager's salary ought to be allocated to the cost
of a bag of sugar, as against a bag of flour. The
same would be true of the cost of heating and lighting the store, and the cost of buying and maintaining
a parking lot for the convenience of customers.s
81. The definition of the "cost of doing business" is merely tautological: "The
cost of doing business or overhead expenses is defined as all costs of doing
business incurred in the conduct of such business. .. ." WYO. STAT. § 40-24
(1957). Nor does the statute fix any period of time for the determination
of overhead cost. The problems created by this omission are more apparent
in periods of rapidly rising or falling prices.
82. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that meaningful cost data
"cannot be obtained from ordinary business records." Automatic Canteen
Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 68 (1953). Cf. Taggart, The Cost Principle in
Minimum Price Legislation 158, 8 U. OF MICH. BUS. STUDIES No. 3 (1938).
83. One reason for the lack of success of the "cost justification" defense under
the Robinson-Patman Act is that "with rare exceptions the cost defense has
proven expensive .... ." TAGGART, COST JUSTIFICATION 543 (1959).
84. Clark, supra note 33, at 122.
85. The lack of a well-established or accepted single set of principles in cost
accounting is discussed in EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 591-93
(1959). A general discussion of the problems occasioned by variations in
accounting techniques is found in DOHR, THOMPSON & WARREN, ACCOUNTING
AND THE LAW, 661-62, 672-73 (1955).
86. See generally, the dissenting opinion of Judge Simpson in State v. Sears,
4 Wash.2d 200, 103 P.2d 337, 353-355 (1940). Cf., Borden Co. v. Thomason,
353 S.W.2d 735, 748-49, (Mo. 1962).
87. Clark, supra note 33, at 122. It is a commonly accepted fact that the allocation of joint costs must necessarily "be arbritrary to some degree." KAySiEN
& TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 192 (1965). In the opinion of one writer, "No
accountant has been able to devise a method yielding . . .joint-cost figures
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Even where a particular cost of doing business bears some
tenable relation to the product involved, the task of allocation
would appear futile. For example, a butcher's salary should be
reflected in the cost computations of various kinds of meat.
Yet if the butcher spends less time preparing a frying chicken
than a rolled roast an equal portion of the cost of his labor
cannot reasonably be charged to each item. Obviously no seller
is prepared to even attempt a definitive allocation of the
butcher's salary to the diverse items in the meat department."8
Nevertheless, the Wyoming statute, by requiring the "cost"
of a product to reflect "all costs of doing business incurred
in the conduct of such business," (emphasis supplied), engages in the fiction that each element of overhead is rationally
allocable to the sale in issue."s
Carried to its ultimate conclusion, the cost determination
philosophy of the statute requires a merchant to increase
rather than decrease the price of goods he is unable to move.
The longer an item must be inventoried, the higher its cost
will be because of the apportioned overhead it accumulates.
The result is that an originally lawful price eventually becomes unlawful because of a slow turnover."
The vagueness of statutory cost provisions has encouraged
constitutional attacks, but with only modest success." The
Wyoming Supreme Court in State v. Langley rejected the
indefiniteness argument on the ground that "cost," as used
in the statute, means "what business men generally mean,
which does not embody a dominance of arbitrariness and guesswork."

Ham-

milton, Cost as a Standard for Price, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 321, 328

(1937).
88. The necessarily subjective approach such an allocation would entail exists
"because there is no exact correspondence between the flow of activities and
the flow of goods, and therefore the attribution of activities to goods must
be based on standards that commend themselves to the good sense of the
observer." EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 85, at 596.
89. The inadequacy of the belief that overhead can be apportioned to individual
products becomes particularly striking in the case of the vertically integrated
seller whose production and distribution operations must presumably be
analyzed on separate functional levels. La Rue, Pitfalls for Price Competitors: State and Federal Restrictions on Below Cost or Unreasonably Low
Prices, 15 W. RES. L. REV. 35, 44-45 (1963).
90. Comment, 58 MicH. L. REv. 905, 914 (1958).
91. Unconstitutionality usually rests on the theory that cost provisions fail to
sufficiently inform merchants of the type of conduct made criminal by the
statute. E.g., Avella v. Almac's, Inc., 211 A.2d 665 (R.I. 1965). The phrases,
"cost" and "cost of doing business" have been held not fatally vague, at
least where injunctive relief is sought. Flank Oil Co. v. Tennessee Gas
Transmission Co., 141 Colo. 554, 349 P.2d 1005 (1960).
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namely, the approximate cost arrived at by a reasonable
rule."": Although dictum,9 3 this proposition nevertheless indicates sympathetic awareness of the difficulties a merchant
faces with respect to cost computation. The Langley court
would further eliminate problems of cost definition by reducing the statute to a "good faith" test of illegality. 4 In effect a merchant who is able to justify a price by any reasonable method of cost accounting, adopted in "good faith," 'does
not violate the statute.
This approach is not with appeal. Though it is arguable the language of the act will reasonably bear such a reading, courts using this analysis would enjoy the flexibility
necessary for reaching a correct result. " This seems desirable
in that at least the opportunity of making the statute accord
with business reality exists. At the same time it must be recognized that the Langley rationale immunizes the act from constitutional challenge, and perhaps legislative revision, by encouraging the belief that the legislature has established an
unobjectionable standard of "reasonableness" in cost ascertainment."
The real significance of the Langley formulation becomes
apparent, however, when it is realized the court is measuring
a seller's" good faith" in terms of inferences to be drawn from
his accounting methods, even to the extent of inquiring whether an accounting system is adopted with a view to forthcoming sales designed to violate the act. 7 If, as Judge Blume
92. Supra note 67, at 365, 84 P.2d at 779.
93. Supra note 67, at 353-54, 84 P.2d at 775.
94. "[A]II that a man is required to do under the statute is to act in good faith
The statute, then, should not prove to be a burden to anyone who acts
....
in good faith." State v. Langley, supra note 67, at 365, 368, 84 P.2d at
779, 781.
95. An alternative technique is to construe the cost provisions as requiring only
that average costs over some reasonable period of time be shown. See, e.g.,
Borden Co. v. Thomason, supra note 86. The statute, of course, implies no
such interpretation.
96. "If . . . cost is ascertainable, under reasonable methods, then such cost is
purely a question of fact, definite and certain, and the standard of conduct
set by the legislature . . . is definite and certain." State v. Langley, supra
note 67, at 364, 84 P.2d at 779. This language has been widely quoted
with approval. See, e.g., Farmington Dowell Prods. Co., Inc., v. Forrester
Mfg. Co., 136 A.2d 542 (Me. 1957).
97. The Wyoming Supreme Court, in the Langley opinion, concludes: "Hence,
if a particular method adopted by a merchant cannot, under the facts disclosed, be said to be unreasonable, and does not disclose an intentional
invasion of the law, the method so adopted should be accepted as correct."
Supra note 67, at 365, 84 P.2d at 779.
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stated in Langley, the primary purpose of the legislation is to
remedy the evil effect of sales below cost on the small merchant,"8 then the test of cost read into the statute is totally
unrelated to its policy. Presumably the accounting methods
of the large chains are as reasonable as those of the sole proprietor and there is no reason for thinking one exercises less
good faith than the other in the selection of accounting techniques. And, if the consequences of selling below cost are
to be regulated by the legislation, it seems unrealistic to believe
the objective can be accomplishd by allowing the alleged offender to escape liability by merely approximating the costs
upon which he "determines price,"9 however appealing this
approach may be as a practical matter. Nor can the Langley
formula be seriously urged if in application it is likely to
involve nothing more than an examination of a seller's intent
to evade the statute. ' ° The expansibility of such a test in relation to accounting methods is readily apparent."' And, finally,
there is a lack of assurance in the cases that a seller's attempt
to approximate his costs will have predictable success even
though the statute is construed as not requiring proof of actual cost. '
The "approximate cost" interpretation, in the final
analysis, has jurisprudential value in that it concedes the point
that the cost provisions of the statute are of little practical
value. In fact it suggests that the fictitious nature of the
entire inquiry into "cost" must inevitably result in vague
generalizations about reasonable methods of accounting adopted in good faith.
98. Id. at 351, 84 P.2d at 774.
99. Particularly when the courts are inclined to resolve all doubts or ambiguities in cost determination in favor of defendant. McIntire v. Borofsky, supra
note 57.
100. The recent case of Tri-Q, Inc. v. Sta-Hi Corp., 404 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1965)
sustains a seller's "educated guess" of his cost of production even though
it was found he had no formal cost accounting system whereby even approximate cost could be determined. Essential to the decision was a finding that
failure to adopt accounting procedures does not support an inference of
intent to violate the statute.
101. One court has held that lack of a cost accounting system is not fatal to
proof of damages occasioned by violation of the statute on the theory it is
"unreasonable to make a precise accounting system an absolute requisite"
since "allocation of 'costs' . . . quite often is set upon an arbitrary basis
anyway." Laundry Operating Co. v. Spalding Laundry & Dry Cleaning
Co., 383 S.W.2d 364, 367 (Ky. 1964).
102. See note 44 supra and note 120 infra.
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The Wyoming statute purports to ease proof of cost by
providing that an" established cost survey for the locality and
vicinity in which the offense is committed. .. shall be deemed
competent evidence to be used in proving the costs of the person... complained against within... this act. "I" This section
contemplates that a trade association in the industry of which
the alleged offender is a member will police the act on the
basis of an averaged cost estimate for the area in which the
offender does business. Trade associations in the past have
undertaken intensive enforcement campaigns in other states."'
Aside from the requiremet that the survey must be "established.., for the locality and vicinity in which the offense
is committed,""0 5 no standards governing the making of a
cost survey are set forth in the statute. Consequently trade
associations enjoy substantial freedom in conducting their
"surveys" and producing an industry cost figure, usually
Some courts
expressed as a percentage of net or gross sales.'
have demonstrated concern with respect to the reliability of
survey methods and techniques. 7 One court, however, has
held that an association cost survey taken at a single plant
in Los Angeles County is competent evidence of the costs of
a merchant doing business in that area."
The only Wyoming case dealing with a cost survey fails
to present a substantial factual question. In Civic Ass'n. v.
Railway Motor Fuels.. a trade association of wholesale and
retail dealers in gasoline and petroleum products in the Cheyenne area was organized for the purpose of enforcing the
103. WYO.STAT. § 40-26 (1957).
104. See Wilson, California Unfair Practices Act and Fair Trade Act, 27 A.B.A.J. 249, 250 (1957).

105. WYO. STAT. § 40-26 (1957). A retail cost survey for an entire state is not
competent evidence of the cost of doing business in a particular locality.
Board of R.R. Comm'rs. v. Sawyers' Stores, Inc., 114 Mont. 562, 138 P.2d
964 (1943). The Montana statute was subsequently amended to permit
statewide surveys. Mont. Laws 1945, ch. 21.
106. For example, one of the earliest so-called "surveys," conducted by the Food
& Grocery Bureau of Southern California, was a questionnaire merely asking: "Based on my total grocery sales for the year 1936, I find that my
% of my net sales." Tannenbaum,
minimum cost of doing business is ---Cost Under the Unfair Practices Acts, 9 U. OF CHI. STUDIES IN BUS. ADMIN.
No. 2, at 50-51 (1939).
107. E.g., a national cost list devised as a guide in fixing prices has been
rejected as an "established cost survey." Johnson v. Farmer, 41 Cal. App.2d
874, 107 P.2d 959 (1940).
108. Los Angeles Laundry-Owners Ass'n v. Cascade Laundry Inc., TRADE REG.
REP. (1950-51 Trade Cas.) 1162667, at 63919 (Super. Ct. Cal. July 11, 1950).
109. 57 Wyo. 213, 116 P.2d 236 (1941).
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sales below cost statute against known price cutters. The
association undertook a cost survey to be used in evidence in
the contemplated litigation. The court found the survey to
be incomplete and inaccurate, and concluded that a self-serving statement of costs would not be given the evidentiary
weight prescribed by the statute.11 ° Among the reasons given
in support of the result were the fact that the cost survey was
not made by an unbiased agency and the questionnaires returned by dealers who were also members of the association
were not reliable."' This rather startling analysis would appear to render invalid any survey conducted by a trade association itself. However desirable this construction may be, it
obviously does not accord with the intent of the legislation.
At a minimum the case suggests that a condition of admissibility may be a showing of independent expertise in the making of the survey.
The main objection to the cost survey is that it is inherently a price fixing device." 2 It is common knowledge that
trade associations exist because merchants believe the exercise of group pressure with respect to price and marketing
policies will stabilize competitive conditions to the eventual
benefit of all. Once established, therefore, the cost survey is
conveniently susceptible to conversion into a uniform price
list," which, in light of competitive pressures and policing
activities of the interested trade association, is readily adopted
by member competitors."' Determination of cost on an industry basis is perhaps the most potentially dangerous activity
110. Id. at 249-53, 116 P.2d at 250-51. Not only did the association employ misleading questionnaires, but it failed to use many of those returned in determining the cost of doing retail business in the area to be 26.05 per cent of
net sales and the cost of doing wholesale business 9.8 per cent of net sales.
No explanation was given for the failure to use all returned questionnaires.
The court thought the survey was suspect because made by inexperienced
surveyors with this very lawsuit in mind.
111. Id. at 251, 116 P.2d at 250.
112. "The sales below cost laws are nothing but authorizations for a rather
crude type of collusive price fixing." Adelman, Integration and Antitrust
Policy, 62 HARV. L. REv. 27, 75 (1949).
113. The case of Los Angeles Laundry-Owners Ass'n v. Cascade Laundry, Inc.,
supra note 108, indicates the tendency of competitors to adopt new price
lists, generally containing higher prices, based on the survey results.
114. The case of California Retail Grocers & Merchants Ass'n. v. United States,
139 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1944) demonstrates the effectiveness of association
efforts to secure conformity to suggested minimum prices. The defendants
in the case, a Sherman Act price-fixing prosecution, unsuccessfully contended their established prices were sheltered by the sales below cost
statute because originally determined on the basis of cost surveys.
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in which a trade association may engage. Average cost figures
supported by the representation of industry-wide validity
breed uniformity in accounting procedures and eventually
uniformity in price.I15 Thus merchants are encouraged to
mark up their products in an amount sufficient to meet the
cost of doing business figure produced by the survey, irrespective of what they consider their legitimate markup to be.
The end result is a uniform markup which insulates the less
efficient merchant from his more efficient competitors." 6
Cost savings that might have been passed on to the consumer
in the form of lower prices are thereby diverted to the merchant whose costs are lowest. Any influence low prices may
have in encouraging greater efficiency, and hence lower costs,
is "dissipated. Aside from the fact that the uniform markup
tends to reduce price competition, the potential for a uniform
increase in price is dramatically apparent. 17 These considerations assume increased significance in view of the legislature's understanding of the explicit purpose of the statute
"to foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair
and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest competition is 'destroyed or prevented.". I.
Assuming it is impossible to prove the actual cost of
selling a product," 9 it follows that if an "established cost
survey" is available it is likely to be decisive evidence of defendant's cost and the basis of the judgment. 2 ' Thus the
statute in practice tends to make a cost survey prima facie
or presumptive evidence of cost, even though its language is
115. See generally, BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 47-55 (1936).
116. See generally, Comment, supra note 90, and Clark, Statutory Restrictions
on Selling Below Cost, 11 VAND. L. Rzv. 105, 123-125 (1957), who concludes
that the effect of the statutes is to require all sellers to mark their goods
up at the same rate.
117. See Note, 57 YALE L.J. 391, 397-98.
118. WYO. STAT. § 40-33 (1957).
119. A summary of expert cost accountant testimony relative to cost ascertainment is found in Borden Co. v. Thomason, supra note 86, at 748-49.
120. E.g., in Dikeou v. Food Distribs. Ass'n., 107 Colo. 38, 108 P.2d 529 (1940).
The court rejected defendant's attempts to prove actual cost of doing
business as "clearly theoretical and arbitrary," while giving effect to two
trade association surveys for the vicinity in question. Cf. Commissioner of
Corps. & Taxation v. Ryan, 323 Mass. 154, 80 N.E.2d 471 (1948). The failure of a plaintiff to produce a cost survey for the area in question may
have the interesting effect of contributing to an ultimate finding of failure
to state a claim for relief under the statute. See, e.g., Plymouth Bldg. Cigar
70102, at 78420
Center v. Dayton Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1961 Trade Cas.)
(Dist. Ct. Minn. August 31, 1961).
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silent as to probative value. 2 ' That the courts have ignored
the practical effect of cost survey provisions is evidenced by
decisions sustaining the constitutionality of such enactments
on the ground that they afford a defendant an opportunity to
prove that his costs are, in fact, lower than the survey figure.122
Since the determination of actual cost is largely illusory, the
cost survey, a product of private interests who cannot be expected to be impartial, is permitted to fix an absolute minimum legal price. In the final analysis a merchant who fails
to conform to the price fixing arrangement engages in unlawful conduct.
REMEDIES AND DEFENSES

Selling below cost in Wyoming may be enjoined, or ma'de
the subject of a damage action, by any " person, firm, private
corporation or trade association."" 3 The word "person" has
been broadly interpreted to permit a private citizen injunctive
relief without a showing of injury or damage.12 ' This generally accepted construction would appear to be in doubt in Wyoming because of the decision in Eckdahl v. Hurwitz, 2 ' which
indicates actual injury must be shown to warrant the granting of an injunction. In addition to imposing criminal sanctions, 2 ' the statute provides for forfeiture of the charter of
corporate defendants. 1 ' Any contract made in violation of the
act is deemed illegal and unenforceable. 2 Unlike a number
of other statutes, the Wyoming act 'does not create an agency
121. A provision identical to that of Wyoming has been construed as merely
creating a rule of admissibility of evidence and not prescribing that a cost
survey shall be prima facie evidence. State v. Sears, supra note 86, 103
P.2d at 344. A statutory attempt to prescribe the weight or credibility of
a cost survey has been held unconstitutionally arbitrary and indefinite. Great
At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F.Supp. 70 (D.C. Minn. 1938). Merely
making a cost survey prima facie evidence is generally permissable. McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 292 N.W. 414 (1940).
122. Associated Merchants v. Ormesher, 107 Mont. 530, 86 P.2d 1031, 1035-36
(1939).
123. WYo. STAT. § 40-31 (1957).
124. The appplicable theory is injury to the public interest. Kofsky v. Smart
& Final Iris Co., 131 Cal.2d. 530, 281 P.2d 5 (1955). The word "person"
has been held to entitle a state to seek injunctive relief under the statute.
People v. Centr-O-Mart, 34 Cal.2d 702, 214 P.2d 378 (1950).
125. 56 Wyo. 19, 103 P.2d 161 (1940).
126. WYo. STAT. § 40-32 (1957).
127. WYO. STAT. § 40-29 (1957).
128. WYO. STAT. § 40-30 (1957).
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with special expertise to administer and enforce the sales
below cost prohibition.'
A store manager or employee is as much subject to liability under the statute as a proprietor or owner."' And relief
may be sought against numerous competitors in a single lawsuit even though concerted action is not alleged."' Since the
Wyoming statute expressly grants immunity from criminal
prosecution to defendants testifying in civil proceedings,1 8 2
self-incrimination is not a ground for refusing to testify in
an injunction action. 3 In general the courts have been permitted broad discretion in fashioning a decree enjoining further violations of the act.1" 4
There is little evidence in the cases that the damage remedy is frequently used, or that it is effective when used. Undoubtedly this is explained by the difficulties in proving actual damages. Those cases approving an award of damages
offer little basis for evaluating the kind of showing necessary
to support a damage claim." ' The damage concept is further
confused by the tendency of courts to relate evidence of actual
injury, generally in the form of loss of bisiness, to the issue
of intent to injure."' The clearest cases for recovery are
those in which direct solicitation of plaintiff's customers re129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

136.

Provision is made for limited enforcement by the Attorney General or local
county attorney. WYo. STAT. § 40-29 (1957).
Opinion of the Attorney General of Oreeon, TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade
Cas.) f 71139, at 79497 (June 22, 1964). Wyo. STAT. § 40-31 (1957) expressly
makes an agent who participates in an offense responsible as a principal.
Socony Mobil Oil Co., Inc. v. Superior Court for the County of Providence,
TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) 1 71037, at 79111 (S.C.R.I. March 5,
1964).
WYO. STAT. § 40-31 (1957).
State v. Ross, 259 Wis. 379, 48 N.W.2d 460 (1951).
An injunction may extend to a defendant's entire line of products, even
though he sold only a few items below cost. Mering v. Yolo Grocery & Meat
Mkt., 127 P.2d 985 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942).
One plaintiff was allowed to get the damage issue to the jury upon his
testimony that since his variable costs amounted to about 50% of gross
sales, he could reasonably estimate that on the volume of business lost to
a competitor selling below cost his out-of-pocket loss was "approximately
50%." Laundry Operating Co. v. Spalding Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co.,
supra note 101, at 366-67.
Whereas a competitor's testimony that he has lost substantial business as
a result of violations of the statute may be one of several factors used
to raise a presumption of unlawful intent, it by no means follows that this
vague testimony of injury by itself is persuasive on the damage issue.
See Los Angeles Laundry-Owners Ass'n v. Cascade Laundry, supra note 108.
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sults in the diversion of business to defendant."'
The view that any citizen may sue on behalf of the public
for breach of the statute poses an interesting question with
respect to the availability of the 'defense of "clean hands."
Several cases have held that violations of the statute may
be enjoined even though the party seeking relief is himself
guilty of selling below cost.'
Since the defense that the parties are in pari delicto will not lie, a court may presumably
enjoin both parties from further violations. The cases rest
on the theory that violations affect and directly concern the
public at large, and consequently unclean hands ought not
permit the continuance of conduct declared by the statute to
be against public policy.1 3
Assuming there exist legitimate and convincing reasons
for prohibiting selling below cost, the private lawsuit does
not lend itself to effective enforcement. The benefit to a
successful plaintiff is short-lived where the market consists
of numerous sellers who frequently engage in sales below cost.
Unless he is prepared to police the entire market, which is
extremely unlikely, the private lawsuit cannot begin to protect either the public or the individual merchant from the
alleged evil effects of sales below cost. Only state action
against all violators would appear appropriate. 4 Yet the
cases suggest relatively little state prosecution has been un137. Laundry Operating Co. v. Spalding Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., supra
note 101; Sandler v. Gordon, 94 Cal. App.2d 254, 210 P.2d 314 (1949). The
latter case awarded punitive damages on the ground that defendant, by
surreptitiously acquiring plaintiff's customer lists and thereafter using
them to solicit customers, was guilty of "oppression and malice." One
statute permits recovery of treble damages. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §
51.111 (1947).
138. Kofsky v. Smart & Final Iris Co., supra note 121; Dooley's Hardware Mart
v. Does 1-10, TR.AE REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.)
70227, at 75864 (Super.
Ct. Cal. Jan. 31, 1962). The latter case reserved the question of the affect
of the "unclean hands" doctrine on plaintiff's right to damages. Cf. Trade
Comm'n v. Bush, 123 Utah 302, 259 P.2d 304 (1953).
139. It has been held that a plaintiff may avoid the unclean hands defense by
seeking declaratory judgment relief as to his right to sell at a stated
price. Hogus v. Kroger Co., 356 SW.2d 267 (Tenn. 1062).
140. An alternative to a single action against a group of alleged violations
would be a series of individual actions. One case brought against a comparatively small merchant by the Attorney General was continued from
time to time to enable plaintiff to commence similar actions against larger
competitors of defendant; a temporary injunction was conditioned on prompt
and vigorous prosecution of defendant's competitors. State v. Applebaum's
Food Mkt., TRADE REG. REP. (1960 Trade Cas.) T 69790, at 77123 (Dist. Ct.
Minn. June 14, 1960). Several states have created agencies to undertake
enforcement litigation. See for example, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 51.113
(1947) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-2-1 to -25 (1953).
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of the difficulties of fair and
dertaken, apparently because
4
uniform enforcement.1 '
A more serious impediment to the effectiveness of the
private lawsuit is the statutory defense of selling below cost
'142 If
"in good faith to meet the legal prices of a competitor.
a seller comes within the requirements of the exemption, he
has a complete defense irrespective of the existence of other
statutory elements of violation. 4 3 Cutting price to meet competition is not, however, without legal risk. The only price a
seller is entitled to meet is a "legal" one "as herein defined."
Since the act does not separately define legal price, it can only
mean one that is not below cost and is not made with the intent of injuring competitors and destroying competition. The
merchant who seeks to meet competition is therefore burdened
with the hopeless task of ascertaining his competitor's intent
as well as his competitor's costs. The elusiveness of the intent
requirement has already been noted, and it is difficult to see
how a merchant can be expected to gauge his competitor's
costs when he is unable to determine his own. Recognizing
this dilemma, the courts have been inclined to construe the
"legal" price provision to mean the defense is satisfied if a
merchant merely believes in "good faith "that the price he
meets is legal.' 4 ' Under this construction the fact that the
price met may turn out to be illegal is immaterial.
141. Denver Post, Feb. 2, 1966, p. 25, col. 1, quotes the Utah Attorney General
to the effect that, even though it is common knowledge the law is being
violated on a wide scale, he is reluctant to select a few merchants for
prosecution when there is no "means of uniform enforcement." The attitude of most state enforcement agencies is probably accurately reflected
in an opinion by the Wyoming Attorney General's office in which it is
conceded state prosecutions are "likely to prove unsatisfactory," hence
private injunctive actions by "persons directly interested" are recommended
as "the most satisfactory procedure." [1932-1940] WYo. A'r'Y. GEN. REP.
& OFP'L. OP'NS., 511, 513 (Apr. 12, 1937).
142. WYo. STAT. § 40-27 (1957) expressly excepts from the operation of the
statute any sales "in an endeavor made in good faith to meet the legal
prices of a competitor as herein defined selling the same article or product
in the same locality or trade area." This "meeting competition" defense
is discussed in Comment, 12 Sw.L.J. 482 (1958).
143. State v. Wolkoff, 250 Minn. 504, 85 N.W.2d 401, 407 (1957). Defendant
has the burden of proof of meeting competition. People v. Pay Less Drug
Store, 25 Cal.2d 108, 153 P.2d 9 (1944). Cf., Plymouth Bldg. Cigar Center
v. Dayton Co., supra note 120.
144. McIntire v. Borofsky, 95 N.H. 144, 59 A.2d 471 (1948) ; State v. Wolkoff,
supra note 143. Legal price statutes lacking a good faith proviso have
not generally withstood constitutional attack. State v. Packard-Bamberger
Co., Inc., 16 N.J.Misc. 479, 2 A.2d 599 (1938) ; Commonwealth v. Zasloff,
338 Pa. 457, 13 A.2d 67 (1940). The belief that the statute presupposes
an absolute legal price is not, however, without supporters. See, e.g., Hogue
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The first objection to a construction which dilutes the
legal price requirement is that liability must turn on the essentially subjective test of "good faith." This is not objectionable assuming the test is meaningfully applied in terms
of the policy of statute. The cases, however, indicate that
good faith exists in practically any situation short of actual
14
There is apknowledge that a competitor's price is illegal.
parently no obligation to even attempt to investigate the
46 It follows that
legality of a competitor's pricing conduct.
in the absence of a workable minimum standard of reasonable
belief of legality, a merchant is entitled to violate the statute
simply because his competitor did it first. The first price
cutter may be subject to liability, but in practical effect he
has immunized the price reductions of his competitors. In
short, save for the obvious situations of an illegal price, a
statute represented as essential to the protection of competition from sales below cost really means that selling below
cost is acceptable so long as your conipetitor does it."'
On the other hand, a literal interpretation of the meeting
competition defense is equally unrealistic. Aside from insurmountable problems of proof, forcing a merchant to compete
at his peril does not encourage price competition. Nor is it
v. Kroger Co., supra note 139. With respect to the "meeting competition"
defense of the Robinson-Patman Act, there is apparently a tendency to
relax the requirements of the defense which relate to a sellers ability to
acquire actual knowledge concerning conduct of a competitor. See, e.g.,
Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964).
145. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocer's Ass'n, 322 P.2d 179
(Okla. 1957), aff'd 360 U.S. 334 (1959), found a lack of good faith because
of knowledge the price being met was illegal. One case seems to suggest
good faith is established by a merchant merely proving his competitor's
prices, and then testifying his price cuts were necessary to economic survival. State v. Wolkoff, 250 Minn. 504, 85 N.W.2d 401 (1957). Compare
State v. Penny Super Mkt., Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1960 Trade Cas.)
%69663, at 76629 (Dist. Ct. Minn. Feb. 1, 1960) ; State v. Kohn, TRADE REC.
69664, at 76630 (Dist. Ct. Minn. April 24, 1958).
REP. (1960 Trade Cas.)
Continuing a reduced price after a competitor abandons his lowered price
has been held to negative any possible inference of good faith. People v.
Pay Less Drug Store, supra note 143. But waiting six weeks to meet a
competitors reduced price is not evidence of lack of good faith. Northern
Cal. Food Dealers, Inc. v. Farmer's Mkt., Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade
68402, at 71723 (Super. Ct. Cal. June 29, 1956). Generally the
Cas.)
courts are content to discuss the good faith requirement in vague and
obscure terms. See State v. Sears, 4 Wash.2d 200, 103 P.2d 337 (1940).
146. See, e.g., State ex rel. Anderson v. Commercial Candy Co., 166 Kan. 432,
201 P.2d 1034 (1949).
147. One court has construed the meeting competition defense as requiring an
absolutely legal price on the ground that, to hold otherwise, renders the
statute unenforceable. Obrecht v. S. Kotzin Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1950-51
62694, at 64017 (Dist. Ct. Md. Aug. 28, 1950).
Trade Cas.)
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reasonable to subject a merchant to expensive litigation in
the event his competitor's price turns out to be illegal. In

view of the necessity to meet prices quickly in a highly competitive industry, the good faith test can never be anything
more than a hindsight test. 4 ' And a requirement of legal
price engages in the questionable belief that a merchant will,
and in fact does, investigate his competitors' prices before
meeting them.
A further problem of meeting competition is presented
by the requirement that the price met be in connection with
"the same article or product in the same locality or trade
area."" 4 " If the provision is literally interpreted, product differentiation would operate to the competitive disadvantage of
the merchant who carries the higher cost brand, as opposed
to a competitor who retails relatively low cost brands. 5 ' To
avoid this result, the word "same" has been broadly construed
to mean "similar" or "comparable."' ' 1 Although there is little authority to support it, a test of cross-elasticity of demand,
or relative substitutibility, has been urged as best suited to
give recognition to competitive products. ' " There is merit to
this suggestion. The statutory word "same" surely contemplates close physical similarity, but some latitude among competitive items with physical differences must be recognized
in order to permit the act to function at all, particularly since
a decline in the price of one differentiated product tends to
bring a decline in the price of a rival product. The difficulty
is that the common tests of functional interchangeability with
respect to end uses,' particularly as applied to market defini148. See Comment, 12 Sw.L.J. 482, 503 (1958), wherein it is suggested that the
meeting competition defense could be made more realistic by eliminating
the "good faith" and "legal" price requirements.
149. WYo. STAT. § 40-27 (1957). Other statutes permit a merchant to meet
the price of a competitor who is selling "substantially the same article or
product." E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-407 (1947).
150. For example, a chain operation may sell a product of its own manufacturer
under its private brand, whereas an independent competitor may only be
able to carry standard brands with higher costs; hence he may be foreclosed from competing with the chain's brand because of the cost disparity.
151. Northern Cal. Food Dealers, Inc. v. Farmers Mkt., Inc., supra note 145.
152. Comment, 58 MICH.L.REV. 905, 918 (1960); Comment, 12 Sw.L.J. 482, 495
(1958).
153. The interchangeability test is discussed in United States v. E. I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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' are not
tion problems in the monopoly and merger cases,154
relevant to the underlying theory of the legislation under consideration. The sales below cost statute is not primarily concerned that conduct may have an impact on general competitive conditions.

SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT POLICY

The continued appeal of statutory restrictions upon selling below cost does not admit of simple explanation. It seems
there exists a broadly shared conviction that failure to make
price provide for a seller's cost is inherently evil, that it is
anti-social conduct. Such a view may be explained in part as
a manifestation of the long recognized tendency among competitors to denounce as "unfair" almost any attempt to compete on the basis of price.' Or perhaps the obvious economic
objections to the statute are deemed insignificant in light of
the overriding moral doctrine of competition it embraces."'
Uncritical acceptance of the alleged purpose of the legislation
by courts and legislatures would seem to support this view.
For example, the opinion of Judge Blume in State v. Langley
demonstrates genuine concern that nothing less than a way
of life is at stake in the statute. 5 7
The statute presupposes that there is seldom any legitimate commercial reason for selling below cost. The defect
inherent in this assumption is that price must in all cases
insure at least a return of costs. Price-cost relationships only
have meaningful significance when measured over a long per154. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964) ; United States
v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
155. Wilcox, Competition and Monopoly in American Industry 5-11, TNEC Monograph 21 (1940).
156. Professor Homer Clark suggests these statutes enact "a moral and ethical
philosophy, not an economic system," and that no longer is "the old-fashioned
ideal of the businessman as a hard-driving competitor who gets ahead by
cutting his costs and his prices" attractive to us. Clark, supra note 116,
at 127.
157. 53 Wyo. 332, 351-52, 84 P.2d 767, 774: "we still have with us the indeThey have hitherto been considered as part of the
pendent merchants ....
'backbone' of every community radiating their influence throughout the
length and breadth of the state, maintaining not alone fair competition,
but adding to, and upholding, the moral fibre of the communities, upon
which, in the long run, the existence of the commonwealth depends. The
legislature has the right, we think to give . . . them a chance to remain
a pillar of support, thus at the same time giving an opportunity for the
maintenance of individualism, still of importance in our day, and which,
except for such legislation, might be entirely crushed."
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iod of time.' Businessmen, like everyone else, live in the shortrun, not the long-run. Consequently, employment of the socalled "cost protection" principle as the determinant of shortrun price policy prevents the market from performing its
primary function of guiding the allocation of resources according to criteria of productivity and consumer demand."'
Denial of the economic function of price on the ground that
competition is protected and encouraged seems indefensible,
at least if there is any basis for the belief that price has some
impact upon competition.
This discussion has sought to demonstrate that the effect
of limiting the impact of the market on the pricing function
may be to encourage price rigidity and, in fact, price increases.1 6 ° Although it is undisputed that a state may constitutionally regulate price,16 the curious thing about the
sales below cost statute is that it is neither enacted or enforced
as a price fixing statute."' Nevertheless, the price fixing feature of the Wyoming statute may assume greater future importance in view of the fact the Supreme Court, in Bulova
Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., '1 has declared unconstituStrict enforcement of the sales
tional the Fair Trade Act.'
below cost statute, in the absence of the ability to prove actual
cost, may produce much the same effect as resale price main158.

KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 62-65 (1965).

159. See Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 391, 397-98 (1948), where it is contended that
prices both below and above cost are necessary to a short-run allocation of
resources, and that to freeze prices at the level of cost "is to foster the
twin evils of high prices and low production." See STOCKING, WORKABLE
COMPETITION & ANTITRUST POLICY 30 (1961): "the workability of imperfect
competition depends on the flexibility of prices with changing costs . .. .
160. See generally, Hamilton, Cost as a Standard of Price, 4 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 321, 328-33 (1937) and McNair, Marketing Functions and Costs and
the Robinson-Patman Act, Id. at 336-38. A summary of an FTC survey
described in FTC REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 861-2 (1945) is
discussed in Comment, supra note 159 at 417-18. It is interesting to note
that the survey found that, with respect to "loss leader" practices in the
grocery industry in Southern California, leader prices prior to the adoption
of the sales below cost act were seldom if ever below invoice cost, whereas
prices of many items not previously employed as loss leaders were increased
after the adoption of the act. The price-fixing nature of the legislation has
been recognized by some courts. E.g., State v. Packard-Bamberger & Co.,
16 N.J.Misc. 479, 2 A.2d 599 (1938).
161. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
162. The understanding of the Court in State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 355, 84
P.2d 767, 775 (1938) is commonly expressed: "The legislature by the
statute here in question, sought, not to fix prices, but to prevent ruinous
price cutting, by which competitors might be injured and competition be
destroyed."
163. 371 P.2d 409 (Wyo. 1962).
164. Wyo. STAT. § 40-8 to -17 (1957).
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tenance legislation. Hence the rationale of the fair trade decision would appear relevant to the matter of selling below cost.
The theory upon which the Wyoming fair trade case
turns is that the "non-signer" '85 provision of the Fair Trade
Act constitutes price fixing by private parties in that it
"leaves to the uncontrolled and uncertain discretion, option
and whim of private parties the determination of a retail price
suitable to their own interests and for their private benefit,
without any regard for the welfare of the public and in derogation of the public's right to a voice in the matter ....

,""' It

is submitted that a more accurate description of the effect
of the sales below cost statute is not to be found. At a minimum the theory of the case impairs the rationale upon which
the constitutionality of the sales below cost statute was sustained in State v. Langley. That this observation has force
is further evidenced by the fact that one of the reasons urged
by Judge Blume in Langley for sustaining the sales below
cost act was that such legislation is analogous to fair trade
acts which "have been upheld as constitutional.""'
The Wyoming Court's treatment of the issue of validity
of selling below cost is not unexceptional in comparison with
the general judicial approach to the subject. The crucial point
is that the manner in which the issue is phrased is decisive.
So long as legislatures and courts view the problem as one
of power to prohibit sales below cost such legislation will
flourish."' When the statute is examined in terms of actual
or probable effect it is likely to be recognized as undesirable
class legislation resting on fictitious underpinnings.
165. The non-signer clause, set forth in Wyo. STAT. § 40-14 (1957), in essence
permits a seller to enforce a resale price maintenance contract against any
person within the channels of distribution of the seller's product, irrespective of the fact such person is not a party to the fair trade contract.
166. Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 409, 418 (Wyo. 1962).
167. State v. Langley, supra note 162, at 360, 84 P.2d at 777. This argument
by analogy has greater significance when it is noted the court's opinion
cites as authority a number of fair trade cases. To complete the exercise
in applied jurisprudence it should be further noted that the court in the
fair trade case draws heavily on the pronouncements of Judge Blume's
opinion in State v. Langley even though the two cases, of course, reach
different results. If the sales below cost statute is recognized to be pricefixing legislation, it is likely to be struck down by a court that has found
fair trade legislation unconstitutional. See, e.g., State v. Wender, 141 S.E.2d
359 (W. Va. 1965).
168. The opinion in State v. Langley is addressed principally to the broad question of whether the legislature in enacting the statute exceeded permissible
constitutional limits of power.
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Moreover, it is seriously to be doubted that isolated sales
below cost have any measurable effect on competition or competitors. Assun.ng such conduct does in fact injure individual
competitors, it should be recalled that our economic system has
never warranted that all individual participants are to be
held harmless from injury. In fact a system guided by impersonal forces must necessarily cast aside those unable to
survive the rigors of the market place. It is precisely at this
point that the philosophy of the blanket prohibition against
selling below cost breaks down. The general objective of our
existing regulatory system is to "promote competition in open
markets.""9 The focus of this national economic policy is on

the preservation of competition, not competitors. 7 ' Maintenance of competitive market structures is the means selected
to effectuate this policy; the concern is "with substantial impairment of the vigor or health of the contest for business,
The statute
regardless of which competitor wins or loses. ,,...
under consideration runs counter to this policy in that it seeks
to insure survival of competitors and certain forms of business organization. Regulation proceeds from essentially private agreement without any workable standard of administrative control.
The only justification for permitting the sales below cost
statute to equate protection of competitors with protection of
competition is that, without such a statute, predatory price
cutting and loss leader selling are not subject to effective
means of control. Experience with the statute fails to support the conclusion that it has accomplished its avowed purpose. The cases indicate that only systematic selling below
cost in pursuance of a design to increase domination or injure
or eliminate a competitor will predictably result in actual
enforcement of the statute. If this is so, then such predatory
conduct is within traditional regulatory framework. It is
169. ATT'. GEN. NAT'L. COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 1 (1955).
170. Courts have recognized that if the health of the competitive process is to
be assured, primary attention cannot be given to "the individual competitor
who must sink or swim in competitive enterprise." Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co.
v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 954 (10th Cir. 1959). See
generally, BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 477-540 (1959). It has been
suggested, however, that the Robinson-Patman Act as a whole is inconsistent with the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Adelman, Effective Competition
and the Antitrusnt Laws, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1289, 1327-50 (1948).
171. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 840 (7th Cir. 1961).
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actionable under the common law doctrine of unfair competition.17 2 It may also violate the Wyoming statutes proscribing local and area price discrimination, 7 ' or the Wyoming
constitutional prohibition of lnonoplies.'7 Selling below cost
may constitute a contract in restraint of trade in violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 7 ' or may be evidence of
monopolization, attempted monoplization, or a conspiracy to
monopolize in contravention of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act. 7 ' Further, a sale below cost is violative of the "unfair
methods of competition" and "unfair practices" provisions
of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,"' if made
with intent or effect of injuring competition. 7 ' It may be
a price discrimination in violation of Section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act,'7 9 and has been held to come within the
"unreasonably low price" prohibition of Section 3 of that
Act.'
The advantage in the general antitrust approach is
that sales below cost may be viewed in their full setting rather
than in the context of impact upon a particular merchant or
class of merchants. The broader approach also permits consideration of general economic conditions, which have changed
dramatically since the time pressure groups gained acceptance
of their statutory schemes to create a cost floor for price.
CONCLUSION

It has been suggested that two general methods of regulating private business conduct appear practicable.'
One is
to establish fairly definite standards in statutory law, leaving
businessmen free to pursue their own interests within those
limits. The other is to leave the maintenance of competition
to an administrative commission vested with broad and pervasive powers. The legislation considered here departs from
both these forms of control. In the event total elimination
of the statute is not possible, and half a loaf must be accepted,
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See note 5 supra.
WYO. STAT. § 40-18, 23 (1957).
WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 30; art. 10, § 8.
26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
Miller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944).
49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1964) as construed in United States

181.

v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963).
Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, 67 HARv. L. REv. 28, 41-42 (1953).
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perhaps a statute simply prohibiting sales at "unreasonably
low prices" would be least objectionable. The strength of such
a formulation is that it enables the courts to develop a meaningful discussion of the problem. The dialogue at present is
largely irrelevant.
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